1862-1863 manuscript copies of correspondence with Lincoln, McClellan, Stanton and Scott regarding the Peninsular Campaign (fair copy, 62p., April 1862) and "Notes upon the Report of Major-General George B. McClellan Upon the Organization of the Army of the Potomac and its Campaigns in Virginia and Maryland;" (fair copy, 65p., August 7, 1863). These were part of the Hitchcock archive, and assume were penned by the General. As commander of the Army of the Potomac, George McClellan was a polarizing figure, revered by many of his soldiers, but reviled in Washington for his over-caution in mounting campaigns, his incessant demands for more troops, and his lassitude in pursuing military advantage. The two manuscripts offered here were originally part of the archives of Maj. Gen. Ethan Allen Hitchcock and deal substantively with McClellan's legacy. Hitchcock apparently copied out at length a body of correspondence between McClellan, Winfield Scott, Sec. of War Edwin Stanton, and President Lincoln regarding two of the best known controversies surrounding McClellan's commandership of the Army of the Potomac: his insistence that the capitol was in imminent danger, requiring 60,000 troops for defense, and his later willingness to remove two thirds of them to support his campaign on the Peninsula. The correspondence provides ample demonstration of McClellan's bullheaded insistence upon his view of the situation and his strategy, and of the mounting frustration of the administration, concisely summarized in a postscript to one of Lincoln's letters: "P.S. - If, at any time, you feel able to take the offensive, you are not restrained from doing so. (signed) A. Lincoln." Obviously collected by Hitchcock to document the controversy, the correspondence provides insight into other matters, such as McClellan's "compassionate conservative" views on slavery: "Military power should not be allowed to interfere with the relations of servitude, either by supporting or impairing the authority of the Master; except for supporting disorder as in other cases; Slaves contraband under the act of Congress, seeking military protection, should receive it; the right of the Government to its own service claims to slave labor should be asserted and the right of the owner to compensation therefore should be recognized... A system of policy thus constitutional and conservative, and pervaded by the influence of Christianity and freedom, would receive the support of almost all truly loyal men, would deeply impress the rebel masses and all foreign nations, and it might be humbly hoped that it would commend itself to the favor of the Almighty." The "Notes Upon a Report," is a lengthy and vituperative attack upon McClellan addressed to Brig. Gen. L. Thomas, dredging up every misestimate, failure to comprehend, and blunder made by McClellan from the summer of 1861 to after his dismissal as commander. Prime among the complaints are McClellan's divergent figures for his manpower needs and strength estimates of the Confederacy, his demand that he needed more troops to mount an offensive despite estimates that he already outnumbered his opponents by more than three men to two, and his insistence that the East, and not the West was the critical theatre of operations. The focus of much of the report, however, is McClellan's refusal to comply with the presidential directive to leave 60,000 men in defense of Washington when he siphoned off troops for the Peninsular Campaign, and his later attempts to blame Lincoln's order to retain McDowell's troops in the capitol for the failure of that campaign. "The order of the President for the detention of McDowell's corps, which was issued for no other reason but because General McClellan had failed in his own duty, and thereby, in the judgment of all men, the facts being known, was precluded from all right of command upon the President's order, and he himself must be held responsible for whatever consequences resulted from that order. But it is evident that those consequences so far as the Army of the Potomac was concerned, were by no means as important as General McClellan is disposed to allege; because, of the three divisions of McClellan's corps, Franklin's was sent to him immediately, and McCall's in ample time to participate in the battles before Richmond; so that, in point of fact, there was but one division of that corps detained from the Army of the Potomac..." The report goes on at considerable length to assess McClellan's misapprehension of the threat posed by the Merrimac, then prowling the rivers and threatening, perhaps, to dislodge Federal forces from Fortress Monroe: "That the Merrimac was ultimately neutralized indeed, that is, destroyed, is a fact which was by no sense due to General McClellan's foresight; but, so far as his personal plan was concerned, it was an accident; and yet his safety and that of his whole army at Harrison's Landing was absolutely dependent upon that accident!" An important and extensive pair of documents revealing of the response to McClellan's dismissal high within the ranks of the Federal Army. (Fine condition with occasional spotting and minor chipping on the last page of the "Notes") * Provenance: The documentary archive descending from the Hitchcock-Nicholis family includes 14 letters from the Hitchcock family (plus a few later copies of letters), 18 Civil War-date receipts for supplies to be used by Nicholis in Washington, and an important "Military Memoir" submitted by Col. T. J. Cram proposing operations up the Peninsula against Norfolk, Petersburg, and Richmond, and containing an important early consideration of the Confederacy's ironclad Merrimac (undated, but presumably about April 1862). The report is filled with strategic ruminations of the drive against the heart of the Confederacy; Cram recognized the value of the river war, and the tremendous psychological impact of the launching of the ironclad Merrimac. He recommended that the Union "assemble ironclad war vessels and others sufficient to move directly, one night, up the mouth of the James River, and there to defy the Merrimac and its attendant rebel craft. It seems to me that it cannot be long before the Navy Department can furnish vessels to do this... What is the Merrimac doing? Much, and that too without any risk to herself..." All told, there are almost two closely written pages concerning the threat posed by the Merrimac. The report ends by recommending improving the fortification of Newport News: "The true policy would be to strengthen it by increased artillery and stronger batteries - sufficient to keep even the ugly Merrimac at a respectful distance, or to sink the monster in the same grave where lie her victims the Cumberland and Congress!"